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1 Introduction
It is common for households to pool or share risk, for instance through mutual insurance
arrangements (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 2001, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, De Weerdt and
Fafchamps 2007) and group loans with joint liability (e.g. Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 2000,
Ghatak 1999, Morduch 1999). The way in which risk sharing arrangements are enforced varies
with the institutional and legal environment. Informal arrangements are thought to be en-
forced through a mix of quid pro quo, altruism, and adherence to social norms (e.g. Coate and
Ravallion 1993, Cox and Fafchamps 2007, Platteau 1994). Formal arrangements, such as in-
surance contracts and funeral societies, combine the above with external enforcement through
courts and other adjudication processes (e.g. De Weerdt and Dercon 2006, De Weerdt, Dercon,
Bold and Pankhurst 2006). What remains unclear is whether and how the nature of the available
enforcement mechanisms a¤ects who shares risk with whom. We investigate this issue using a
laboratory-type experiment designed specically for this purpose and conducted in the eld.
Following the seminal work of Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993), the theo-
retical literature has modelled informal risk sharing as a repeated game, in some cases, be-
tween self-interested parties (e.g. Kocherlakota 1996, Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2001, Foster
and Rosenzweig 2001) and, in others, between parties who are intrinsically motivated by feel-
ings of altruism and anticipated guilt (e.g. Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ 1992, Ravallion and
Dearden 1988, Cox 1987, Cox, Eser and Jimenez 1998, Cox and Fafchamps 2007). This theo-
retical literature predicts that external enforcement overcomes the limitations imposed by de-
pendency on intrinsic incentives and social enforcement. Consequently, it facilitates risk sharing
between individuals who have little knowledge of one another and who neither trust nor care
about one anothers wellbeing.1
1Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2004) discuss the limitations imposed by self-enforcement on the formation of risk
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The primary purpose of this paper is to seek empirical support for predictions derived with
reference to this literature using data from a controlled behavioral experiment conducted in
rural Zimbabwe. The advantage of using an experimental approach is that it facilitates causal
inference. This is because the possible e¤ect of who groups with whom on the enforcement
mechanism that emerges is ruled out by design, leaving only the e¤ect of the latter on the former
to be identied. However, the approach requires that the participating subjects be placed in a
somewhat articial decision-making environment. This may cast doubt on whether the behavior
observed during the experiment bears any resemblance to the corresponding behavior as it
naturally arises (e.g. Bardsley 2005, Levitt and List 2007). We aim to minimize this potential
drawback in three ways. First, the experimental subjects are villagers who are known to engage
in informal risk sharing. Second, each experimental session is conducted in a single village to
ensure that the participants interact with people they already know. Third, the experiment is
designed to allow face-to-face, rather than anonymous, interaction. A comparison of behavior
within the experiment with real risk sharing within a sub-sample of villages indicates that these
measures are at least partially successful (Barr and Genicot 2008).
The experiment involves two rounds, played over two consecutive days. In the rst round,
participants independently play a version of Binswangers gamble choice game (Binswanger
1980). In the second round, participants play the game a second time but are o¤ered, ex ante,
the opportunity to form risk sharing groups. Within each group the proceeds of all members
gambles are shared equally. The institutional environment and, hence, the set of available
enforcement mechanisms, is varied across three treatments applied during the second round.
In the rst treatment, agreements to share winnings are externally enforced by the exper-
imenter. In the second treatment, participants can secretly defect from an agreement after
sharing networks.
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observing the outcome of their own gamble. This implies that agreements are enforced only by
intrinsic motivations (e.g., altruism and guilt). In the third treatment, participants can defect
from an agreement after observing the outcome of their own gamble, but they have to pub-
licly conrm their defection to everyone in the session. This implies that extrinsic incentives
in the form of social sanctions (e.g., shaming, threatened exclusion) can be brought to bear as
additional incentives to deter defection.
Using the data generated by the experiment, Barr and Genicot (2008) show that individuals
are most likely to enter into risk sharing agreements when those agreements are externally
enforced, although even then many potentially benecial agreements are not entered into.2
They also show that it is only under external enforcement that group formers engage in more
risk taking. Further, in disagreement with the theoretical literature cited above, they nd that
individuals are least likely to enter into risk sharing arrangements in the third treatment. They
go on to show that this third nding is consistent with two possible theoretical explanations:
either social sanctions in the form of full or partial exclusion, are costly to inict; or individuals
su¤er from time-inconsistent preferences. However, they do not test either of these theories.
In contrast to Barr and Genicot (2008), the focus of this paper is on who commits to share
risk with whom under each of the three treatments. We investigate this by combining the exper-
imental data with information from two surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise conducted
on the same households. These additional sources of information provide a rich description of
the economic and social contexts of the experimental participants, including data on the kin-
ship and marriage ties they share, and the various churches and community based organizations
(CBOs) to which they belong. To our knowledge, this is the rst time that experimental data
2Barr and Genicots probit model for the individual decision to join a group in the experiment shows that the
institutional (treatment) and regional environment (research area) are important predictors of group formation.
The sex and education level of the participant also have marginal e¤ects, while other individual characteristics
such as age, being a household head and being married do not a¤ect group formation.
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on group formation has been so richly complemented by pre-collected survey and genealogical
information.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows. In general, a pair of individuals is more likely to
share risk the more similar they are in terms of age and gender. Belonging to the same religious
group and being related by marriage support enforcement through social sanctioning possibly
because each is associated with behavioral rules that are traditionally enforced through status
manipulation, shame and guilt. In contrast, while co-members in economic CBOs are highly
likely to group together when risk sharing relations are enforced either externally or by intrinsic
incentives, they tend not to group together when social sanctions can be brought into play.
This is consistent with social sanctions being costly to both sanctioners and sanctionees when
applied within the context of these relationships because it would undermine the functioning of
the organizations to which both belong.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by presenting the experimental
design. In section 3, we draw on existing theory to develop a set of predictions about who groups
with whom in various contract enforcement environments. In section 4, we describe our testing
strategy. Data sources and variable construction are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we
present summary statistics relating to the experiment and, in Section 7 we present the empirical
results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The experiment is based on a simple gamble choice game played with villagers in 14 di¤erent
villages. In every village, each household is invited to send one adult, preferably the household
head or his/her spouse, to participate in the games played in their village. Each participant
plays the game twice, once on the rst day and a second time the next day. Each round takes
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between one and two hours.
In each round, each participant is interviewed privately and asked to select one of six possible
gambles g, ranked from the least (1) to the most risky (6). The gamble choice set is the same
for all participants. Riskier gambles have higher expected returns. A similar game structure
was originally used by Binswanger (1980) to elicit risk preferences; the choice of gamble implies
a range of possible values for the individuals coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The gambles
used in our experiment are presented in Table 1 together with the implied ranges of the risk
aversion coe¢ cient.3
On the rst day, each participant plays the game individually and winnings are distributed at
the end of play. At the end of the rst days round, participants are told to come back the next
day to play the game a second time. They are informed that the next day, before choosing their
gambles, they can if they wish form groups with other participants and that those in a group
will share second day winnings equally. There are no restrictions on the size or composition of
groups. Before going home, participants attend a training session during which they are shown
how forming a group to pool winnings reduces risk, and how and to what extent the grouping
arrangements will be enforced.
On the second day, participants are rst asked to declare whether they have formed a group
and with whom. Participants in a group have to register together and their intent to form a
group is recorded by the enumerators. After all groups have been declared and agreed on, each
participant then proceeds to select one of the six gambles individually and privately. At the end
of play, winnings are calculated, pooled and shared equally for those in groups, and privately
distributed to all participants.
3The gambles are expressed in Zimbabwean $. The o¢ cial exchange rate at the time of the experiment was
around Z$55 for US$1 while the black market rate was around 2.5 times that amount. In the areas where the
experiment was conducted and at the time of the experiments, the daily wage for a farm labourer was around
Z$200, similar in magnitude to the average winnings per round from the experiment of Z$158 in round 1 and
Z$172 in round 2.
6
The verbal framing of the game is kept to a minimum and, as a consequence, the game can
be likened to a variety of real life situations, including risk sharing, which has been extensively
studied in village communities (e.g. Udry 1994, Ligon et al. 2001, Fafchamps and Lund 2003),
and group lending with joint liability (e.g. Karlan 2007, Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 1999,
Ghatak 2000).4
To facilitate an analysis of the e¤ect of di¤erent enforcement mechanisms on who groups,
with whom to share risk, three treatments are applied during the experiment. Under treatment
1, sharing is enforced by the experimenter: once participants have declared a group, they cannot
subsequently change their mind, i.e., they cannot refuse to share their second day winnings with
others in their group. So, regardless of the outcomes of all their gambles, their winnings are
pooled and shared equally. Under treatment 2, after having selected a gamble and observed their
individual winnings (but not those of others in their group), participants are o¤ered a chance
to defect from their group, i.e., they can decide to keep their individual winnings. If they opt
to do so, they do not receive a share of the winnings of others in their group. Treatment 3 is
similar to treatment 2 except that participants who elect to keep their individual winnings have
to conrm their decision publicly in front of everyone participating in the same experimental
session. Under each treatment, the consequences of and rules relating to group formation
and defection are explained to participants during the training session on day one.5
The treatments facilitate an analysis of the e¤ect of di¤erent forms of enforcement on who
shares risk with whom in the following way. In treatment 1, the risk sharing arrangements are
perfectly and exogenously enforced by the experimenter. In treatment 3, defection is public and
can therefore trigger social punishment after the game is completed. Enforcement is extrinsic
4There is no lending in our experiment, but participants de facto invest a sure amount (gamble 1) into various
risky investments (gambles 2 to 6, see Table 1).
5No rules were applied to or recommendations made concerning gamble choices within groups.
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in the sense that it relates to the importance that individuals place on their repeated economic
and social interactions within the village and whether and how they think these interactions
might be damaged should they defect publicly during the experiment. In contrast, in treatment
2 defection is private and the identity of a defector is either impossible or di¢ cult to detect.6
In this treatment, enforcement is thus primarily, if not exclusively, based on intrinsic incentives:
altruism, reciprocity, and a desire to avoid feelings of guilt.
Each of the 14 villages studied here was randomly assigned to one of the three treatments.
All the participants in a single village receive the same treatment. Because the total number of
villages is small, possible imbalances may arise between villages. We describe how we deal with
this in the testing strategy section below.
3 Theory and predictions
Our objective is to identify the e¤ects of imperfect enforcement on who shares risk with whom.
This is an empirical contribution, so we do not present a fully specied theoretical model of
group formation for risk sharing. Instead, we combine insights drawn from the already rich
and diverse theoretical literature on this topic with ethnographic information pertaining to the
villages in our study to generate a series of testable predictions.
Given the symmetry of the game and the nature of the gamble choice task, it is useful to
rst consider what groups would be formed among identically risk averse agents. Under perfect
exogenous enforcement, i.e., enforcement by the experimenter, individuals should group as long
as the mutual insurance benet exceeds the costs of forming a group. Let (s) denote the
6Given that participants had only a small number of gambles to choose from, under treatment 2, they may have
been able to draw limited inferences about whether others defected from the amount of money that is distributed
to them at the end of day two. However, as noted by Barr and Genicot (2008), inference is impossible in groups of
size 2 because the other player can always claim to have selected the same gamble and gotten the same outcome.
In groups of 3 or more, it is theoretically possible to infer that someone has defected, but impossible to tell who.
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benet derived from joining a group of size s and let the cost of joining the group be c. Cost c
represents the time and e¤ort required, during the 24 hour interval between the two rounds of
the experiment, to agree with others to share winnings. In general, (s) increases with s but at
a decreasing rate.7 It follows that if c > 0 there is an upper limit s on group size determined
by 0(s) = c. If c = 0, it is optimal for all participants to join a single, village-wide group.
Di¤erences between participants in risk attitudes may a¤ect group formation. Assortative
matching by risk attitudes has been discussed in detail by Legros and Newman (2007) in the
context of marriage markets with non-transferable utility. They show that, if the form of risk
sharing is unrestricted, risk averse and risk neutral individuals should team up so that the latter
can insure the former. However, this is precluded in our experiment because we impose equal
sharing of winnings within groups. With equal sharing exogenously imposed, Newman and
Legrosmodel predicts positive assortative grouping by risk attitudes.8
Newman and Legros do not explore the impact of risk attitudes on the likelihood of an
individual choosing to marry. However, in our experiment where groups may be of any size
and are more transient in nature, this could be important. If we assume that c is constant
across individuals, more risk averse individuals should be more likely to group as it is they
who benet most from mutual insurance. For risk neutral individuals, the gain from grouping
is zero, and thus does not exceed the cost of forming a group as long as c > 0. Combined,
these two observations about how risk attitudes a¤ect group formation imply that, unless c = 0,
7This is most easily shown if we ignore gamble choices. Let yi be individual is winnings and let average
winnings in a group of size s be ys = 1s
Ps
i=1 yi. Given the experimental setting, the yis are i.i.d. Mean
winnings are una¤ected by group size: E[ys] = E[yi] 8s. The variance of ys, however, falls with s: V ar[ys] =
1
s2
Ps
i=1 V ar(yi) =

s
where   V ar(yi). It follows that the utility v(y) of any risk averse individuals increases
in s but at a decreasing rate, i.e., v(ys)  v(ys 1) < v(ys+1)  v(ys) since
V ar[ys 1]  V ar[ys] = 
s  1  

s
> V ar[ys]  V ar[ys+1] = 
s
  
s+ 1
8Athough the authors do not emphasize the fact in their paper, the model presented in Barr and Genicot
(2008) similarly predicts assortative matching by risk attitudes.
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multiple risk sharing groups will be observed in each village, participants will sort into groups
with reference to their risk attitudes, and less risk averse individuals may not group. So, our
rst prediction concerning who shares risk with whom is as follows:
Prediction 1: Participants who are more similar with respect to their risk attitudes are
more likely to group together to share risk during the experiment.
In practice, group formation costs c are likely to vary across pairs of individuals. Some pairs
will be more socially proximate, i.e., they will be used to interacting with one another because
they are related by blood or marriage, or belong to the same religious congregation or CBOs.
These pairs will have lower group formation costs and, other things being equal, will be more
likely to group. Pairs who are similar with respect to gender, age, education, role within the
household, and possibly income and wealth may also face lower group formation costs as they
will nd it easier to communicate and negotiate with one another. So, our second and third
predictions concerning who shares risk with whom are as follows:
Prediction 2: Participants who are more similar in terms of gender, age, education, and
so on are more likely to group together to share risk during the experiment.
Prediction 3: Participants who are socially proximate because they are kin, or belong to
the same religion, or are co-members in CBOs are more likely to group together to share risk
during the experiment.
So far we have assumed that risk sharing is perfectly enforced. Now we turn to the likely
e¤ects of imperfect enforcement on who shares risk with whom and, hence, to the predictions
that are of principal interest.
In the absence of any enforcement, the best response for a selsh individual is to cheat,
i.e., join a group, take a high risk gamble, share winnings if a low payo¤ is realized, and defect
otherwise. If all participants are selsh and aware of this, no-one will form a group. We therefore
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expect groups to be formed only between individuals who face su¢ cient incentives, intrinsic or
extrinsic, not to cheat. This leads to the prediction that there will be less group formation
under imperfect enforcement, i.e., under treatments 2 and 3 compared to treatment 1. Barr and
Genicot (2008) presented evidence in support of this prediction.
Treatment 2 relies primarily, if not exclusively, on intrinsic incentives. Given this, we expect
participants under treatment 2 to form groups only with those who they trust, possibly because
they believe that they feel more altruistic towards them, and towards whom they feel more
altruistic. Hamilton (1964) hypothesized that individuals, human or otherwise, exhibit more
altruistim towards close kin and for non-human species there is now a considerable body of
evidence supporting Hamiltons prediction (Brembs 2001). Individuals may also be more inclined
to trust those with whom they share religious beliefs and interact frequently via community-
based organizations. Social proximity in the form of kinship, co-religion, and co-memberships
in CBOs matter under treatment 1 because they reduce group formation costs. If, in addition,
they form a basis for altruism and trust, they should be more strongly associated with group
formation under treatment 2 compared to treatment 1. So, our fourth prediction concerning
who shares risk with whom is as follows:
Prediction 4: Social proximity in the form of kinship, co-religion and co-memberships in
CBOs will be more strongly associated with risk sharing under Treatment 2, i.e., when enforce-
ment depends on intrinsic incentives, compared to Treatment 1.
In treatment 3, additional extrinsic incentives are brought into play. Models of repeated
interaction between self-interested agents, e.g., Coate and Ravallion (1993), have shown that
agreements can be enforced by the threat of exclusion from future interactions. Although in our
experiment the risk pooling game is not repeated, under treatment 3 participants have to defect
publicly and this may adversely a¤ect the ongoing relationships they have with other villagers.
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Put another way, the public nature of the defections e¤ectively transforms the group formation
in the game into an element in the series of repeated interactions in which the villagers are
naturally engaged. This introduces an additional deterrent against defecting which, all other
things being equal, should make group formation more attractive under treatment 3 compared
to treatment 2. This is especially true among pairs of individuals who are engaged in ongoing
series of repeated interactions such as co-members in religious congregations and CBOs, and
even more especially where those interactions are voluntary and, thus, severable.
However, Barr and Genicot (2008) found less group formation under treatment 3 than under
treatment 2 and concluded that all other things must not be equal. They went on to show
theoretically how, under treatment 3, less group formation may arise from a fear of jeopardizing
ongoing valuable relationships either by giving way to the temptation to defect on the spur
of the moment (due to inconsistent time preferences) or because other group members give way
to such a temptation. By extrapolation, when pairs of individuals are heterogeneous, the likely
cost associated with jeopardizing an ongoing series of interactions will be greater for pairs who
are engaged in more valuable and more voluntary ongoing series of interactions.
The villagers involved in this study are used to forming CBOs to solve problems associated
with missing markets and public good provision. Hence, these organizations and the relationships
associated with co-membership in these organizations are likely to be of considerable value to
the villagers. That said, membership in these organizations is voluntary and cases of expulsion
and fractionalization are not unheard of. Thus, we assume that co-memberships in CBOs are
both highly valued and vulnerable to disruption under treatment 3, should co-members choose
to group. Religion is di¤erent because membership is primarily an individual decision and
exclusion is more di¢ cult. Members of the same church may be (or become) friends but even
if they are (or do) not they tend to tolerate one another. Kinship is potentially valuable but it
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is not, within the context of our experiment, voluntary.9 Ties between in-laws are particularly
interesting in the Zimbabwean context as they are associated with many reciprocal obligations
and, no matter how displeased one is with ones in-laws, these reciprocal obligations remain
and the repeated interaction continues. Based on this reasoning, our fth and sixth predictions
concerning who shares risk with whom are as follows:
Prediction 5: Social proximity in the form of kinship and co-religion will be more strongly
associated with risk sharing under Treatment 3, i.e., when social sanctions can be brought to
bear on participants who publicly default, compared to Treatment 1.
Prediction 6: However, co-members in CBOs will withdraw from group formation under
treatment 3 (compared to Treatments 1 and 2).
Other factors may also come into play. One possibility is competition: participants may
maximize a function that not only increases in their own monetary payo¤, as we have assumed
until now, but also decreases in the monetary payo¤s of others in the village. If this is the
case, group formation may be perceived as a way of reducing competition and the potential
disruption that unequal winnings might cause. Alternatively, participants might want to join
forces in order to outsmartthe experimenter. In this case, if participants see winning as an
indication of gamesmanship, assortative matching on risk aversion may not take place, but we
may observe matching on luckin the rst round of the game. To the extent possible, we control
for these other factors when testing predictions 1 to 6.
9Marriage and divorce are voluntary in some societies including the one under investigation. However, our
experimental design restricted participation to a single participant per household, thereby precluding married
couples from both participating. So, in our dataset kinship corresponds to genetic relatedness and to being
in-laws.
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4 Testing strategy
We do not have detailed information about the negotiations that took place between the par-
ticipants during the group formation process and, this being the case, we are restricted to a
reduced-form analysis. The other constraint placed upon us by our data relates to sample size;
for example, we have too few observations to e¤ectively explore non-linearities in the data.
Bearing these constraints in mind, we adopt the approach to group formation analysis pro-
posed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Arcand and Fafchamps (2008). This approach uses
network notation to represent groups and relies on the estimation of dyadic regression models
of the general form:
mij = (xij)
where mij = 1 if i is in a risk sharing group with individual j, and 0 otherwise; and (:) denotes
the logit function. E[mij ] increases with factors that make i (or j) more likely to group. Since
by experimental design participants can only belong to one group, E[mij ] also increases in the
size of the group to which i (or j) belongs. Finally, E[mij ] increases in factors that make i more
likely to group with j, such as similarity or co-membership in CBOs.
The mijs are not independent of each other and, this being the case, one may be tempted to
base the estimation on a joint maximum likelihood function. However, there are several problems
with this approach. First, the estimation would require solving a complicated optimization
problem with multiple integrals. This could, in principle, be achieved using the Gibbs algorithm,
but at a non-negligible cost in terms of programming. Second and more importantly, writing
down the joint likelihood function would force the researcher to specify the functional form of the
interactions between observations. Theoretically, this could improve e¢ ciency, but it could also
result in inconsistent estimates if the specied form of the interaction were wrong. So, we opt
14
for a simpler and more transparent approach whereby we regress mij on a vector of ij-specic
regressors applying a logit and correct for interdependence across observations using the method
suggested by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) for dyadic regressions. Train (2003) recommends
a similar logit approach to model multiple choice decisions (in our case, whom i groups with)
whenever each choice depends in the same way on choice-specic regressors.
As noted by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), the estimation of dyadic models requires some
care regarding the way regressors are incorporated. In our case, the network matrixM  [mij ] is
symmetrical since mij = mji by construction. Hence, to ensure that E[mij ] = E[mji] regressors
must enter the model in a symmetric form, i.e., such that xij = xji. For individual-specic
regressors xi and xjone simple way of satisfying this requirement is to enter regressors in the
form (xi + xj) and jxi   xj j.10
Taking all these factors into account, we estimate a model of the following form:
mij = (0 + 1tij + 2dij + 3(tij  dij)
+4jzi   zj j+ 5(zi + zj)) (1)
where: dij is a vector of the characteristics of the relationship between individuals i and j, i.e.,
kinship and co-membership in religions and CBOs; tij is a vector of treatment dummies; zi is a
vector of the relevant characteristics of individual i including his or her gender, age, education,
income, wealth, and as a proxy for their risk attitudes, their gamble choice g1i = f1; :::6g in
round 1; and the s are parameters to be estimated.
Before we proceed any further, note that our ability to indentify the predicted e¤ects
by estimating model (1) depends on the experiment not being embedded within an ongoing,
10When, in addition, each node i has the same number of links (which is not the case here), it is not possible to
identify factors that make it more likely for i to have more links. This renders the regressors of the form (xi+xj)
redundant.
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community-wide risk sharing arrangement in every village. If the experiment is perfectly em-
bedded within a community-wide risk sharing equilibrium with perfect truth-telling, participants
could agree to pool risk outside the experiment. Thus, any treatment feature could be undone
and should, as a consequence, not be expected to impact systematically on observed behavior
within the experiment. If this were the case, 1 and 3 would be statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Furthermore, if group formation costs within the experiment were positive, however
small, we would observe no group formation and, hence, all the coe¢ cients in (1) would be
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Provided this is not the case, we can rule out perfect
embeddedness, in which case experimental features do matter and can be used to draw inference
about underlying behavioral determinants.
We use model (1) to test the predictions presented in the previous section. Signicant
elements in 1, identify the impact of the treatments on the likelihood of an individual joining
a group. Since treatment 1 is the omitted category, a negative coe¢ cient on treatment 2 and
a larger negative coe¢ cient on treatment 3 would be consistent with the ndings of Barr and
Genicot (2008).
The sign and signicance of coe¢ cients 2; 3; and 4 provide information regarding the
e¤ects of group formation costs and intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on who groups with
whom. A signicantly positive 2 supports Prediction 3 as it provides evidence that group
formation costs are important and decline with social proximity dij . A signicantly negative 4
corresponding to characteristic z supports Prediction 2 as it provides evidence that is and
js who are more similar in terms of z are more likely to join the same group. Further, if the
element in 4 that corresponds to the dyadic di¤erence in risk attitudes, jg1i   g1j j, is signicant
and negative it supports Prediction 1 as it provides evidence that is and js who are more
similar in terms of their risk attitudes are more likely to group together.
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Signicant elements in 3, the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms tijdij , indicate that the
importance of di¤erent types of social proximity varies across treatments. Since treatment 1 is
the omitted category, a signicant positive 3 for treatment 2 dij provides evidence in support
of Prediction 4, that social proximity facilitates group formation when enforcement depends
on intrinsic incentives alone. A signicant positive 3 for treatment 3 dij is evidence that
the social proximity and repeated interactions associated with dij support social enforcement.11
Signicant positive coe¢ cients on the interaction between treatment 3 and kinship and treatment
3 and co-religion provide support for Prediction 5. A signicant negative 3 indicates that
individuals are choosing to protect the social ties and repeated interactions associated with a
specic type of social proximity from the consequences of someone defecting in public during
the experiment. A signicant negative coe¢ cient on the interaction between treatment 3 and
co-memberships in CBOs provides support for Prediction 6.
Finally, signicant elements in 5 identify characteristics associated with joining larger
groups or with joining a group rather than staying a singleton.12 The term 5(zi + zj) are
included primarily as controls. However, it is useful to note that a signicantly negative coef-
cient on g1i + g
1
j provides evidence that less risk averse individuals are less likely to join risk
sharing groups.
Winnings wi from round 1 are also included in z. If participants see winning as an indication
of acumen or luck and if these attributes are universally valued, this could lead to assorting on
rst round winnings and a negative and signicant coe¢ cient on jwi   wj j. If participants who
were lucky in the rst round think they do not need insurance in the second round and, so,
choose not to group, we would observe a negative coe¢ cient on (wi + wj).13
11Under treatment 3, reputational considerations in general should raise 2, the coe¢ cient on the treatment
dummy, but should not generate any signicant interaction term.
12To see why, suppose that individuals with a large value of z form larger groups. This implies that E[mij ] is
an increasing function of zi + zj and hence that 5 is positive.
13A negative coe¢ cient on (wi + wj) could also potentially result from a wealth or income e¤ect.
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Model (1) is estimated using a logit. As emphasized earlier, it is essential to correct standard
errors for non-independence across observations. Non-independence arises principally because
residuals from dyadic observations involving the same individual i are correlated, negatively or
positively, with each other. Standard errors can be corrected for this type of non-independence
by clustering either by dyad, as proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), or by village. The
second approach corrects for possible non-independence not only within dyadic pairs sharing
a common i or j but also across all the dyads participating in the same experimental session.
However, the estimates of the standard errors that it returns are consistent only when the
number of clusters is large.14 We have data from only 14 villages and, for this reason, we cluster
by dyad rather than village.
As treatments are randomly assigned to villages, it should not be necessary to control for
village characteristics. However, because the number of villages is small, unbalancedness across
villages is a concern (see Table A1 in the appendix). To correct for this, village xed e¤ects are
included in some specications.
5 The data
The experiments were conducted in 2001 in 23 Zimbabwean villages. However, in this paper
we use the data from only 14. Of the remaining 9, three were assigned to a control treatment
in which no group formation was allowed and 6 were not fully enumerated during the various
surveys upon which we draw. The control treatment villages contain no information about group
formation and are thus dropped from the analysis presented here. The six villages that were
not fully enumerated have incomplete information regarding household income, wealth, kinship,
14Nichols and Scha¤er (2007) argue that when the number of clusters is less than 50, clustering may result in
incorrect standard errors.
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religion and memberships in CBOs. When we cross the data to generate dyadic observations,
incompleteness leads to a massive loss in usable observations, raising the possibility of selection
bias. For this reason we prefer to omit these villages from our analysis. Since villages were
randomly assigned to treatments, this should not a¤ect the validity of our inference.
Of the 14 villages in our sample, 10 were established in the early 1980s as part of a land
redistribution programme. These resettled villages are relatively small and geographically con-
centrated. owing to the randomness of the settler selection process, inhabitants of these villages
are less likely to be genetically related than members of non-resettled villages. However, in the
large majority of cases they have lived in the same village for more than a decade, they engage
in more associational activity and share more marriage ties (Barr 2004, Dekker 2004).
Data on each participants characteristics, such as age, gender, years of education and their
position within the household, were collected at the time of the experiment. These data are
complemented by survey data relating to the participantshouseholds. The household surveys
were conducted prior to the experiments, so any variables generated using the survey data cannot
be inuenced by the outcomes of the experiment.
As measures of household income and wealth, we use the variables constructed by Trudy
Owens and Hans Hoogeveen on the basis of the 1999 round of the Zimbabwe Rural House-
hold Dynamics Study (ZRHDS) collected by Bill Kinsey. Wealth is measured in terms of live-
stock. Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998), Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens (2000), and
Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) discuss this dataset in detail.
The data on memberships in various religious groups and community-based organizations
(CBOs) are drawn from a survey by Barr in 2000 (see Barr (2004) for details). In the case
of the latter, we focus on co-memberships in CBOs with an explicit economic purpose, e.g.,
micro-nance, mutual insurance, funeral societies, irrigation and livestock rearing cooperatives
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as it is these that are both valuable and voluntary.
Our data on family and marriage ties are derived from a specically designed social mapping
exercise conducted in 1999 and 2001 by village focus groups involving at least one representative
from each household residing in each village (Dekker 2004). In the analysis, genetic relatedness
is captured by a dummy variable taking the value 1 for relatives and zero otherwise. Relatedness
by marriage is captured by a second dummy variable taking the value 1 for dyads related by
marriage but not genetically and zero otherwise.
6 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the 382 participants who took part in both rounds of the
experiment in the 14 villages.15 These observations form the basis for our analysis. The sample
is evenly split between men and women. The average participant is middle-aged and has slightly
more than primary education. Two thirds are married and are either household heads or the
spouses of household heads. Both annual household monetary income and livestock wealth are
approximately log-normally distributed and are incorporated into the analysis in log form.16
The majority of participants belong to a religious community, most often one of the many
apostolic religions existing in Zimbabwe. On average, participants belong to between three and
four economic CBOs.
Also reported in Table 2 are the proportions of the sample playing under each of the treat-
ments, the proportion who joined groups, the average gamble choices in each round of the
15Of the participants in the rst round in these villages, 19 did not turn up on the second day, sending a
replacement from the same household in their stead. Because we do not have rst round gamble choice data for
the replacements, they are excluded from the analysis that follows. However, if we do not control for gamble choice
in the group formation logits and include the replacements, the other ndings remain qualitatively unchanged.
16To avoid losing observations with no income or livestock wealth, we use log(crop income+1) and log(livestock
wealth+1). Livestock wealth is measured in money terms using local market prices and household data on numbers
of livestock of di¤erent types.
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experiment, and the average winnings per participant in each round. Across the sample, just
under half of the participants join sharing groups in the second round of the experiment and
average group size is 3.17. Figure 1 presents a histogram of the size of group joined by each
participant under each of the three treatments. Participants who do not join a group appear
on the left as groupsof size 1. Groups are small even under treatment 1 and are smaller still
under treatments 2 and 3. Further, as shown by Barr and Genicot (2008), the propensity to
group is lowest under treatment 3 when extrinsic incentives are allowed to come into play.
Several other individual-level descriptive statistics relating to the experiment are worth men-
tioning even though they are not apposite to our predictions. First, 48 and 46 percent of the
participants won the higher payo¤ from their gambles in rounds 1 and 2 respectively and win-
ning the higher payo¤ was not correlated across the rounds. These statistics indicate that the
gambles were fair and independent.17 Second, few participants reneged during the experiment:
under treatment 2, 37 participants joined groups, 15 of those went on to win high payo¤s and,
thus, may have been tempted to defect, but only 3 did so; under treatment 3, 45 participants
joined groups, 24 of these went on to win high payo¤s, but only one defected. With so few
defections, it is impossible to investigate their determinants. However, the descriptives suggest
that participants were quite adept at identifying trustworthy partners and tended not to be
tempted to defect, especially in public.18
Table 3 presents the characteristics of all the possible pairs or dyads of participants that can
be made out of the 382 individual participants. By possible pairs or dyadswe mean dyads
that could have chosen to join the same risk sharing group within the experiment. These are all
within-village dyads as, by design, between-village dyads could not group together.
17Post-play, group discussions indicated that, while the participants did not have a good grasp of the notion of
independence, they did consider the gambles to be unxable and fair.
18 Interestingly, the one defector under treatment 3 was a visitor to the village in which she played. She was
scheduled to and indeed did get on a bus back to the nearby town only a few hours after the second session was
completed.
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Only 7% of all possible dyads joined the same risk sharing group. Even under treatment 1
where there was perfect exogenous enforcement, only 12% of the dyads joined the same group.19
Straight away this suggests that either the equal sharing rule deterred participants with dis-
similar risk preferences from grouping together or group formation costs and enforcement issues
a¤ected grouping decisions.
Only 20% of the dyads belong to the same religious group. This reects the diversity of
faiths present in each of the villages. The average dyad has approximately one co-membership
in an economic CBO, although the maximum number of co-memberships in economic CBOs is
9. Owing to the prevalence of resettled villages in our sample and the fact that each household
could send only one participant to the experiments, only 2 percent of the dyads in our sample
are genetically related. Relatedness by marriage is more commonplace: 19 percent of the dyads
are related by marriage. Dekker (2004) proposes and nds support for the notion that, in the
resettled villages, marriage has been used to create social ties between households.20
Since the gamble choice variable g1i takes values from 1 to 6, the maximum di¤erence in
gamble choice is 5 and the maximum sum is 12. The average absolute di¤erence in gamble
choices is 1.23. The average di¤erence in round 1 winnings within dyads is 116 Zimbabwean
dollars and the average sum of round 1 winnings is 324 Zimbabwean dollars.
7 Econometric analysis
Coe¢ cient estimates and corresponding standard errors for model (1) are presented in Table
4. All standard errors and corresponding indicators of signicance are corrected for dyadic
19Treatment 2 is under-represented in the dyadic sample because villages had to be dropped owing to incomplete
data.
20We have no information on geographical proximity. However, the study villages are small and geographically
concentrated, i.e., not interspersed with elds. The majority of participants have lived in the same village for one
or two decades: Gans (1968) and Michaelson (1976) both nd that the importance of geographical proximity as
a determinant of tie formation declines over time.
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clustering. The logit model in the rst column includes two treatment dummies (treatment 1
is the basis for comparison) and the four social tie variables described above but no interaction
terms. This model identies the raw treatment e¤ects 1tij . The logit model in the second
column also includes the interaction terms 3(tij  dij) and provides the rst set of test results
relating to our six predictions. The signicance of the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms
included in the regressions tell us whether the e¤ects on grouping of each social tie in treatments
2 and 3 di¤er from its e¤ect in treatment 1. To establish whether each social tie has a signicant
e¤ect on grouping in either treatment 2 or treatment 3, we have to test whether the sum of the
coe¢ cient on the appropriate interaction term and the coe¢ cient on the social tie in treatment
1 is signicant. This is what the linear restriction tests at reported at the bottom of the table
do. In the third column the uninteracted treatment dummies are replaced by a full set of village
dummies. This model provides a second set of test results. Once again, linear restriction test
results are also reported.
Before turning to the results pertaining to our six predictions, note that one of the treatment
dummies is statistically signicant in columns 1 and 2. This rules out perfect embeddedness of
the experiment within an ongoing community-wide risk sharing arrangement.21 Once again, in
accordance with Barr and Genicot (2008), there is signicantly less group formation under treat-
ment 3, when social sanctioning is possible. Treatment 2 is intermediate in terms of its impact
on group formation but, in the presence of all the controls, it is statistically indistinguishable
from treatment 1.
21Post play interviews with participants in the control villages where group formation was not proposed by
the experimenter provide further evidence against perfect embeddedness; in none of the control villages did
participants spontaneously agree to share winnings amongst themselves.
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7.1 Results
Prediction 1: The di¤erence in round 1 gamble choices, jg1i   g1j j, is never signicant. So,
Prediction 1 is not supported: group formation in the experiment is not assortative with respect
to risk attitudes.22 The sum of round 1 gamble choices, g1i + g
1
j , is also never signicant. This
indicates that risk averse individuals are no more likely to join sharing groups or to form larger
groups.23 The coe¢ cient on the sum of round 1 winnings, wi + wj , is negative and signicant
in column 1 suggesting that participants who won more in round 1 are less likely to group in
round 2. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of the village xed e¤ects.
These results are consistent with earlier ndings based on survey data. For instance, Fafchamps
and Gubert (2007) and De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2007) both nd that risk sharing relation-
ships are no more likely between individuals with di¤erent risk proles or abilities to bear risk.
Prediction 2: All three models in Table 4 provide strong evidence of assortative grouping
with respect to gender, i.e., the coe¢ cient on the dyadic di¤erences in gender is negative and
highly signicant. This is consistent with Prediction 2 which states that participants are more
likely to group with others who are similar to themselves. This may be because, for them, group
formation is less costly.24
Prediction 3: The model in column 1 indicates that, on average across all treatments,
genetically related dyads are more likely to group. However, the coe¢ cient on this variable
uninteracted is insignicant in columns 2 and 3, indicating that genetic relatedness is not sig-
nicantly associated with grouping under treatment 1, i.e., when only group formation costs
22 In a similar experiment, but involving only treatment 2 and conducted in Colombia Attanasio, Barr, Cardenas,
Genicot and Meghir (2009) found evidence of assoriting with respect to risk attitudes, especially among close falimy
and friends. The most likely explanation for their relative success is sample size; over 2,000 individuals distributed
across 70 sessions took part in their experiment.
23There is also no evidence of assortative matching on risk preferences even when the analysis is restricted to
the sub-sample assigned to treatment 1, i.e, group formation under external enforcement.
24Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2009) show that assorting with respect to gender is not owing to trust: there
is least gender assorting under treatment 2 when trust matters most.
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are important. The linear restriction tests in columns 2 and 3 indicate that genetic relatedness
has a signicant e¤ect on group formation under treatment 3, where its cost-lowering capacity
is combined with its capacity to support enforcement based on social sanctions, even though
neither of these capacities is su¢ cient to generate a signicant e¤ect on its own.
Once the village dummies are introduced, there is evidence that co-memberships in economic
CBOs increases the likelihood of grouping together under treatment 1. This nding is consistent
with Prediction 3 and suggests that prior experience of grouping together voluntarily leads to
lower group formation costs.
Prediction 4: Only one of the interaction terms involving the treatment 2 dummy is
signicant and, even then, in only one of the models. Prior to the introduction of village
dummies, i.e., in column 2, co-memberships in economic CBOs are associated with an increased
likelihood of grouping together under treatment 2 both in absolute terms and as compared to
treatment 1. This ndings is consistent with Prediction 4. However, this e¤ect is not observed
in column 3. The introduction of village dummies alters the apparent nature of the e¤ect of
CBO co-memberships on group formation from being trust-based to cost-based. We will return
to this issue below.
Prediction 5: The coe¢ cients on the interaction terms between the treatment 3 dummy
and co-religion and the treatment 3 dummy and marriage ties are positive, signicant and robust
to the inclusion or exclusion of the village dummy variables. These ndings are consistent with
Prediction 5 and indicate that co-religion and marriage ties support enforcement based on social
sanctioning.
Prediction 6: The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the treatment 3 dummy
and co-memberships in economic CBOs is negative, signicant and robust to the inclusion or
exclusion of the village dummy variables, although it is smaller in absolute magnitude when
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the village dummies are included. This is consistent with Prediction 6. The signicance of the
overall e¤ect of co-memberships in economic CBOs on grouping under treatment 3 varies between
columns 2 and 3. The model in column 2 indicates that the desire to protect these valuable
ongoing relationships from the possible e¤ects of a public defection signicantly outweighs their
e¤ect on the cost of group formation and trust, whereas the model in column 3 indicates that
the desire to protect these relationships simply cancels out their e¤ect on the cost of group
formation and trust.
8 Summary and discussion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the extent to which available enforcement mechanisms
a¤ect who shares risk with whom. Our approach was to apply dyadic regression analysis to
data from a specically designed behavioral experiment, two surveys, and a genealogical map-
ping exercise. The experimental element in the research design was critical as it excluded any
causal inuence running from who was sharing risk with whom to the enforcement mechanism
adopted. Three treatments were applied during the experiment, each corresponding to a dif-
ferent enforcement mechanism: perfect enforcement by an outside party; enforcement through
intrinsic incentives such as altruism and mutual trust; and enforcement through extrinsic incen-
tives arising from the fear of social punishment possibly in the form of exclusion from future
interactions.
Combining insights from the rich and diverse theoretical literature on risk sharing with
ethnographic information pertaining to the context in which we conducted the experiment we
derived six predictions concerning who would share risk with whom during the experiment and
how this would vary across the three enforcement mechanisms.
Five out of the six predictions received at least some support from the data: in accordance
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with Prediction 2, participants of the same gender were more likely to group together to share
risk under all treatments; in accordance with Prediction 3, there is weak evidence that genetic
relatedness and co-memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose support risk sharing
under treatment 1, although in each case the identication of the e¤ect depends critically on
the model estimated; in accordance with Prediction 4, co-memberships in CBOs may be of
greater support to risk sharing under treatment 2, i.e., when trust is important, although once
again this nding is not robust across model specications; in accordance with Prediction 5,
marriage ties and co-religion are more strongly associated with risk sharing under Treatment
3 compared to Treatment 1, i.e., when grouping to share risk is enforced by the experimenter;
and in accordance with Prediction 6, those with co-memberships in CBOs serving an economic
purpose withdrew from grouping under treatment 3, i.e., when social punishments could be used
to enforce grouping to share risk.
The analysis depended on the estimation of a reduced form model of group formation. How-
ever, the ndings are consistent with group formation being easier or less costly between indi-
viduals of the same sex and, possibly between kin and those who share more co-memberships
in CBOs serving an economic purpose. Co-memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose
may also provide a basis for mutual trust. However, here, in particular, the perturbing of the
result when village dummies are added to the model needs some consideration. The density of
each the four types of social ties included in our models varies signicantly across villages, with
the variation being most signicant in the case of co-memberships in economic CBOs. This
is undoubtedly leading to problems of identication and indicates that future studies should
involve a larger number of villages or reduce the number of treatments applied or aim to match
the village samples across treatments rather than assigning treatments randomly.
Our ndings concerning which type of social ties support informal enforcement based on
27
social sanctioning and which are protected from the consequences of social sanctions having to
be applied are considerably more robust. Co-religion provides a foundation for enforcement based
on social sanctioning, possibly because of religious traditions about transgressions, admissions,
contrition and forgiveness. Marriage ties between in-laws also provide a basis for enforcement
through social sanctioning, although, here, contrition and forgiveness would seem less likely to
be involved.
Finally, pairs of participants who, through their co-memberships in CBOs serving an eco-
nomic purpose, are likely to be engaged in highly valued but vulnerable repeated exchanges are
more likely to group when a third party is enforcing the contract but withdraw from group for-
mation when there is a risk of public defections. This is important because it provides support
for Barr and Genicots (2008) theoretical explanation as to why less risk sharing was observed
under treatment 3 compared to treatment 2. It, thus, highlights a weakness in more widely
accepted theories of risk sharing and provides an alternative explanation as to why many appar-
ently benecial interactions do not take place. It suggests that villagers are very protective of
their most valued series of repeated interactions and take the potential impact of any prospective
interaction on their tried and tested ones into account when such new prospects emerge. Sadly,
recent reports indicate that Zimbabwean civil society has su¤ered from the extreme pressure
placed upon it since we conducted our experiments. A follow-up study in six of the villages
included in the analysis above shows that 73 percent of the CBOs enumerated in 2000 no longer
exist.
References
Altonji, J. G., Hayashi, F. and Kotliko¤, L. J. (1992). Is the Extended Family Altruistically
Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data., Americal Economic Review, 82(5):11771198.
28
Arcand, J.-L. and Fafchamps, M. (2008), Matching in Community-Based Organizations. (mimeo-
graph).
Attanasio, O., Barr, A., Cardenas, J., Genicot, G. and Meghir, C. (2009), Risk Pooling, Risk
Preferences, and Social Networks, CSAE working paper WPS/2009-20.
Bardsley, N. (2005). Experimental Economics and the Articiality of Alteration., Journal of
Economic Methodology, 12(2):23951.
Barr, A. (2004). Forging E¤ective New Communities: The Evolution of Civil Society in Zim-
babwean Resettlement Villages., World Development, 32(10):175366.
Barr, A. and Genicot, G. (2008). Risk Sharing, Commitment and Information: An Experimen-
tal Analysis., Journal of the European Economic Association, . (forthcoming).
Barr, A., Dekker, M. and Fafchamps, M. (2009), Bridging the Gender Divide: An Experimental
Analysis of Group Formation in African Villages. (mimeograph).
Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1995). Group Lending, Repayment Incentives, and Social Collateral.,
J. Devel. Econ., 46(1):118.
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes Towards Risk: Experimental Measurement Evidence in
Rural India., Amer. J. Agric. Econ., 62(3):395407.
Bloch, F., Genicot, G. and Ray, D. (2004), Social Networks and Informal Insurance. (mimeo-
graph).
Bourdillon, M., Mashita, T. and Glickmann, M. (1977), Traditional Religion and an Independent
Church., Christianity South of the Zambezi, Vol. part 2, Bourdillon, M.F.C (eds), Mambo
Press, Gweru, pp. 192210.
29
Brembs, B. (2001), Hamiltons Theory., Encyclopaedia of Genetics, Academic Press.
Coate, S. and Ravallion, M. (1993). Reciprocity Without Commitment: Characterization and
Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements., J. Dev. Econ., 40:124.
Cox, D. (1987). Motives for Private Income Transfers., J. Pol. Econ., 95 (3):508543.
Cox, D., Eser, Z. and Jimenez, E. (1998). Motives for Private Transfers Over the Life Cycle:
An Analytical Framework and Evidence from Peru., Journal of Development Economics,
55(1):5780.
Cox, D. and Fafchamps, M. (2007), Extended Family and Kinship Networks., Handbook of Devel-
opment Economics, Vol. 4, T. Paul Schultz and John Strauss (eds.), Elsevier, Amsterdam.
(forthcoming).
Daneel, M. (1977), The Growth and Signicance of Shona Independent Churches., Christianity
South of the Zambezi, Vol. part 2, Bourdillon, M.F.C (eds), Mambo Press, Gweru, pp. 177
192.
De Weerdt, J. and Dercon, S. (2006). Risk-Sharing Networks and Insurance Against Illness.,
Journal of Development Economics, 81(2):33756.
De Weerdt, J., Dercon, S., Bold, T. and Pankhurst, A. (2006). Group-Based Funeral Insurance
in Ethiopia and Tanzania., World Development, 34(4):685703.
De Weerdt, J. and Fafchamps, M. (2007), Social Networks and Insurance against Transitory and
Persistent Health Shocks. (mimeograph).
Dekker, M. (2004). Sustainability and Resourcefulness: Support Networks During Periods of
Stress., World Development, 32(10):17351751.
30
Fafchamps, M. (1999). Risk Sharing and Quasi-Credit., Journal of International Trade and
Economic Development, 8(3):257278.
Fafchamps, M., Goyal, S. and van der Leij, M. (2005), Scientic Networks and Coauthorship.
(mimeograph).
Fafchamps, M. and Gubert, F. (2007). The Formation of Risk Sharing Networks., Journal of
Development Economics, 83(2):32650.
Fafchamps, M. and Lund, S. (2003). Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines., Journal of
Development Economics, 71:26187.
Foster, A. D. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (2001). Imperfect Commitment, Altruism and the Family:
Evidence from Transfer Behavior in Low-Income Rural Areas., Review of Economics and
Statistics, 83(3):389407.
Gans, H. (1968), People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions, Basic, New York.
Genicot, G. and Ray, D. (2003). Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements., Review of
Economic Studies, 70(1):87113.
Ghatak, M. (1999). Group Lending, Local Information, and Peer Selection., Journal of De-
velopment Economics, 60(1):2750.
Ghatak, M. (2000). Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the
Peer Selection E¤ect., Economic Journal, 110(465):60131.
Gunning, J., Hoddinott, J., Kinsey, B. and Owens, T. (2000). Revisiting Forever Gained:
Income Dynamics in the Resettlement Areas of Zimbabwe, 1983-1997., Journal of Devel-
opment Studies, 36(6).
31
Hamilton, W. (1964). The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior., Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 7:152.
Ho¤, K. (1996), The Emergence of Organization in Informal Insurance. (mimeograph).
Hoogeveen, J. and Kinsey, B. (2001). Land Reform, Growth and Equity: A Sequel., Journal
of Southern African Studies, 27:12736.
Jackson, M. O. (2008), Social and Economic Networks, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Karlan, D. (2007). Social Connections and Group Banking., Economic Journal, 117:5284.
Kimball, M. S. (1988). FarmersCooperatives as Behavior Toward Risk., Amer. Econ. Rev.,
78 (1):224232.
Kinsey, B., Burger, K. and Gunning, J. W. (1998). Coping with Drought in Zimbabwe: Survey
Evidence on Responses of Rural Households to Risk., World Development, 25(1):89110.
Kocherlakota, N. R. (1996). Implications of E¢ cient Risk Sharing Without Commitment.,
Rev. Econ. Stud., 63(4):595609.
Legros, P. and Newman, A. F. (2007). Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching
with Nontransferabilities., Econometrica, 75(4):10731102.
Levitt, S. and List, J. A. (2007). What do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Prefer-
ences Tell us about the Real World., Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2):15374.
Ligon, E., Thomas, J. P. and Worrall, T. (2001). Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village
Economies., Review of Economic Studies, 69(1):20944.
Michaelson, W. (1976), Man and His Urban Environment: A Sociological Approach, Addison-
Wesley, Reading, MA.
32
Morduch, J. (1999). The Micronance Promise., Journal of Economic Literature, 37(4):1569
1614.
Nichols, A. and Scha¤er, M. (2007), Clustered Standard Errors in Stata, United Kingdom Users
Group Meeting 2007. available at http://repec.org/usug2007/crse.pdf.
Platteau, J.-P. (1994). Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist: Part II - The
Role of Moral Norms., J. Development Studies, 30(4):753815.
Platteau, J.-P. (1995). An Indian Model of Aristocratic Patronage., Oxford Econ. Papers,
47(4):636662.
Platteau, J.-P. (1996), Traditional Sharing Norms as an Obstacle to Economic Growth in Tribal
Societies., Technical report, CRED, Facultés Universitaires Note-Dame de la Paix, Namur,
Belgium. Cahiers No. 173.
Ravallion, M. and Dearden, L. (1988). Social Security in a Moral Economy: An Empirical
Analysis for Java., Rev. Econ. and Stat., 70:3644.
Train, K. E. (2003), Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Udry, C. (1994). Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in
Northern Nigeria., Rev. Econ. Stud., 61(3):495526.
33
 Figure 1: Sizes of group joined
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Table 1. Gamble choices in Z$ and implied relative risk aversion coefficients
Choice High payoff Prob. Low payoff Prob. EV RA class RA coeff.
1 100 50% 100 50% 100 Extreme infinity to 7.51
2 190 50% 90 50% 140 Severe 7.51 to 1.74
3 240 50% 80 50% 160 Intermediate 1.74 to 0.81
4 300 50% 60 50% 180 Moderate 0.81 to 0.32
5 380 50% 20 50% 200 Slight-neutral 0.32 to 0.00
6 400 50% 0 50% 200 Neutral-negative 0 to -ve infinity
Table 2. Characteristics of participants
Mean Std. Dev.
Subject Characteristics
Female 52%
Age 41.97 17.75
Years of schooling 6.76 3.21
Household head 42%
Spouse of household head 21%
Married 66%
Annual income (Zim$) 2,562         3,374          
Value of livestock wealth (Zim$) 11,656       10,124        
Belongs to a religious community 88%
Memberships in economic groups 3.30 2.85
Genetic relatives in same session 0.77 1.45
Relatives by marriage in same session 5.92 6.61
Resettled household 76%
Experimental variables
Played under treatment 1 42%
Played under treatment 2 23%
Played under treatment 3 35%
Joined a group in round 2 49%
Group size (singletons included) 3.17 3.01
Gamble choice in round 1 3.23 1.17
Winnings in round 1 157.13 106.60
Observations 382
Table 3. Characteristics of all possible participant dyads
Mean Std. Dev.
Co-grouping in the experiment 
Chose to join same group in experiment 7%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 1 12%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 2 8%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 3 2%
Prior social proximity:
Belong to same religious group 19%
Co-memberships in economic groups 0.940 1.134
Related by blood 2%
Related by marriage 19%
Treatments:
Treatment 1 (perfect, exogenous enforcement) 44%
Treatment 2 (intrinsic enforcement only) 16%
Treatment 3 (intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic) 40%
Gambles:
Difference in Round 1 gamble choice 1.230 1.066
Sum of Round 1 gamble choices 6.466 1.621
Round 1 winnings:
Difference in Round 1 winnings 116.457 95.794
Sum of Round 1 winnings 323.597 150.778
Observations 10470
Table 4. Dyadic regressions on membership in the same risk pooling group
(1) (2) (3)
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Social proximity
Belong to same religious group [R] 0.176 0.176 0.044 0.191 0.056 0.187
Co-memberships in economic CBOs [C] 0.101 0.066 0.108 0.074 0.133 0.074 *
Genetically related [G] 0.581 0.306 * 0.433 0.476 0.359 0.486
Related by marriage [M] 0.037 0.240 -0.094 0.259 -0.154 0.272
Treatment effects 
T2 (intrinsic motivations only) -0.231 0.392 -0.523 0.461
T3 (intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic) -1.804 0.309 *** -1.938 0.374 ***
Treatment effects interacted with social proximity
T2 x Belong to same religious group (T2 x R) -0.200 0.518 0.344 0.537
T2 x Co-memberships in economic CBOs (T2 x C) 0.400 0.203 ** 0.146 0.206
T2 x Genetically related (T2 x G) -0.188 0.743 -0.315 0.842
T2 x Related by marriage (T2 x M) -0.198 0.590 -0.444 0.579
T3 x Belong to same religious group (T3 x R) 0.893 0.421 ** 1.082 0.436 **
T3 x Co-memberships in economic CBOs (T3 x C) -0.485 0.193 ** -0.343 0.183 *
T3 x Genetically related (T3 x G) 1.115 0.769 1.229 0.868
T3 x Related by marriage (T3 x M) 1.073 0.583 * 1.093 0.634 *
Experimental variables
Difference in round 1 gamble choices 0.045 0.081 0.042 0.082 -0.009 0.087
Sum of round 1 gambles 0.063 0.055 0.068 0.055 0.052 0.056
Diff. in round 1 winnings ('00s of Zim$) 7.3e-5 0.001 0.000 0.001 8.2e-5 0.001
Sum of round 1 winnings ('00s of Zim$) -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001
Difference in individual characteristics
Difference in gender -1.895 0.347 *** -1.914 0.343 *** -1.955 0.339 ***
Difference in age -0.013 0.009 -0.014 0.009 -0.017 0.009 *
Difference in head or spouse dummy -0.214 0.172 -0.210 0.175 -0.184 0.178
Difference in years of schooling 0.017 0.030 0.018 0.030 0.025 0.029
Difference in log of household income 0.092 0.093 0.093 0.087 0.068 0.062
Difference in log of livestock wealth 0.028 0.047 0.023 0.045 0.008 0.042
Sum of individual characteristics
Sum of female dummies 0.128 0.140 0.120 0.143 0.029 0.154
Sum of ages 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007
Sum of head and spouse dummies -0.100 0.196 -0.108 0.195 0.123 0.198
Sum of years of schooling 0.038 0.032 0.034 0.031 0.061 0.032 *
Sum of log household income -0.061 0.080 -0.055 0.074 -0.016 0.065
Sum of log of livestock wealth 0.053 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.002 0.043
Intercept -2.576 1.579 -2.384 1.517 -2.218 1.342 *
Village dummies included no no yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.177 0.189 0.227
Linear restriction tests (F-tests, significance levels tabulated)
(T2 x R) + R
(T2 x C) + C
(T2 x G) + G
(T2 x M) + M
(T3 x R) + R
(T3 x C) + C
(T3 x G) + G
(T3 x M) + M
Observations 10470 10470 10470
**
*
Notes: All standard errors adjusted to account for dyadic non-independence; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at  5%; * significant 
at 10%.
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Table A1. Characteristics of participants across treatments
T1 T2 T3
T1 and T2 T2 and T3 T1 and T3
Participant characteristics
Female 53% 48% 53%
Age 41.0 43.0 42.0
Years of schooling 6.7 6.5 7.0
Household head 38% 53% 40% ** *
Spouse of household head 23% 15% 25% *
Married 65% 66 69%
Annual income (Zim$) 2745 2163 2607
Value of livestock wealth (Zim$) 12344 10795 11412
Belongs to a religious community 86% 86% 90%
Memberships in economic CBO 2.63 1.52 2.41 *** ***
Genetic relatives in same session 0.53 1.16 0.80 *** **
Relatives by marriage in same session 5.64 3.85 7.62
Experimental variables
Gamble choice Round 1 3.23 3.45 3.09 **
Winnings Round 1 161 151 158
Winnings Round 2 168 156 175
Joined a group in Round 2 65% 42% 34% *** ***
Group size in Round 2 4.7 2.7 1.7 *** *** ***
Dyadic characteristics
Belong to same religious group 19% 21% 20%
Co-memberships in economic CBOs 0.980 0.718 0.986 *** ***
Genetically related 2% 4% 2% *** ***
Related by marriage 18% 18% 21% *** ***
Notes: *** difference significant at 1%; ** difference significant at  5%; * difference significant at 10%
Difference between:
